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With the internationalization of markets and the pro-
gressive liberalization of world trade, the threat of foreign competi-
tion has revived the age-old cry for protectionism: to protect the
nation's balance of payments, to protect domestic labor from import-
induced unemployment, and to protect domestic industry from the
unfair competition of low wage countries. These arguments are par-
ticularly appealing in times of recession, and political office seekers
are not loath to embrace them, especially in election years.
For an industry constrained to live in a free trade environment
where it is striving for survival, profitability, and growth, foreign
competition is a serious challenge. It is a disruptive force which un-
dermines the market control of oligopolized industries and the cartel-
like price maintenance schemes prevalent in many competitive in-
dustries. It causes instability by undermining "mutual dependence
recognized," by promoting defection among cartel partners, and by
encouraging entry. Foreign competition is the nemesis of orderly
marketing and hence becomes a prime target for neomercantilist
governments and the interest groups which manipulate them.
It is the thesis of this article that the remedies for the import prob-
lem--quotas, orderly marketing agreements, trigger price systems,
and the like-do not provide adequate mechanisms for insuring ac-
ceptable industry performance or protecting the public interest. In-
stead of compelling--or even promoting-the kind of structural and
behavioral changes which are imperative if an industry is to over-
come its competitive infirmities, these protectionist devices, more
often than not, are likely to have precisely the opposite effect, i.e., to
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perpetuate the very infirmities that caused the industry's plight to
begin with. In short, an ailing organism is not prepared for the rigors
of survival in nature by being privileged to live in the shelter of a
hothouse.
THE UNITED STATES STEEL INDUSTRY: A CASE STUDY
The domestic steel industry has demanded protection from the
steadily burgeoning import competition since the long steel strike of
1959, claiming at various times and in diverse forums that it has
been victimized by dumping, unfair competition, and export sub-
sidies.' A review of the industry's economic performance since World
War II, and an assessment of the protection it has been accorded-
first under the Voluntary Restraint Agreement (hereinafter VRA) of
1969 and later under the Trigger Price Mechanism (hereinafter
TPM) of 1978-should underscore the difficulties of fashioning pub-
lic policies designed to improve industrial performance through im-
port restraints.
Performance: Price Escalation and Loss of Competitiveness
The persistent price escalation of steel prices during the 1950s was
the primary cause of the industry's lackluster performance during
the 1960s-resulting in the erosion of domestic markets by substitute
materials and imports, the loss of export markets not tied to Agency
for International Development (AID) control, and the decline in re-
turn on investment.
The facts on steel pricing are beyond question. According to the
Council of Economic Advisers:
Steel prices played an important role in the general price in-
creases of the 1950s. Between 1947 and 1951, the average in-
crease in the price of basic steel products was 9 percent per
year, twice the average increase of all wholesale prices. The
unique behavior of steel prices was most pronounced in the
mid-1950s. While the wholesale price index was falling an aver-
age of 0.9 percent annually from 1951 to 1955, the price index
for steel was rising an average of 4.8 percent per year. From
1955 to 1958, steel prices were increasing 7.1 percent annually,
or almost three times as fast as wholesale prices generally. No
other major sector shows a similar record.
2
During the 1960s, steel prices entered a relatively quiescent stage.
The major factor in dampening the industry's enthusiasm for
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marching in lockstep toward constantly higher price levels was the
burgeoning of import competition. Thus, between January, 1960 and
December, 1968, a period of nine years, the composite steel price
index increased only 4.1 points, or 0.45 points per year. Starting in
January, 1969, however, after the State Department had success-
fully persuaded the Europeans and Japanese to accept voluntary
quotas on their sales to the United States (i.e., to enter into an infor-
mal international steel cartel), imports were cut back drastically and
the domestic steel prices resumed their pre-1960 climb.
The Nixon administration's price controls, in effect from August,
1971, to April, 1974, temporarily attenuated the steady climb of steel
prices. But in 1974, spurred by a worldwide steel shortage, they re-
sumed their long-run trend upward, rising 30 percent, as compared
to 17 percent for all industrial commodities. In spite of its contention
that it was living under a regime of de facto price controls, the record
indicates the contrary. The Wall Street Journal reported:
The base price of hot-rolled sheet steel has climbed about 63%
to the present $283.50 a ton from its $173.50 a ton level when
government wage and price controls ended in April, 1974. A few
days after the controls ended, the price was boosted 10% to
$191 a ton, and it was raised 15% to $220 a ton in July, 1974.
The base quote climbed 6.3% to $234 a ton on Oct. 1, 1975.
The hot-rolled sheet base price was raised twice in 1976. The
quote went up 6.4% to $249 a ton on June 14 and was increased
another 6.5% to $265 a ton on Dec. 1. The 7% boost that took
effect June 19 of this year brought the base price to its present
$283.50 a ton.3
The industry, it seemed, had once again returned to its traditional
behavior model. The leaders again set prices "at full costs-fixed costs
plus marginal costs-plus target rate of return, subject to certain lim-
its. ' ' 4 The followers again did what was expected of them. Inevitably,
prices were characterized by uniformity and upward rigidity.
Performance: Technological Backwardness
The United States steel industry's performance on the technology
front-like its rigid, inflationary price policy-served to reduce its
international cost competitiveness and to make it vulnerable to im-
port competition. The facts of the case document this finding.
The major steel inventions in recent years, including the basic
oxygen furnace, continuous casting, and vacuum degassing, came
from abroad. They were not made by the American steel giants.
In innovation, as in invention, the American steel giants seem to
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lag, not lead their smaller domestic rivals and their foreign competi-
tors. The oxygen furnace, for example, the only major technological
breakthrough in basic steel making since the turn of the century,
was invented and innovated by the miniscule Austrian steel industry
in 1950. It was first installed in the United States in 1954 by a small
company (McLouth) and not adopted by the steel giants until more
than a decade later: United States Steel in December, 1963, Bethle-
hem in 1964, and Republic in 1965. As of September, 1963, the larg-
est steel companies, operating more than 50 percent of basic steel
capacity, had not installed a single basic oxygen furnace, whereas
smaller companies, operating only 7 percent of the nation's steel ca-
pacity, accounted for almost half of the basic oxygen installations in
the United States.
5
Despite the fact that the new oxygen process entailed substantial
operating cost as well as capital cost savings, the United States steel
industry during the 1950s "bought 40 million tons of the wrong kind
of capacity-the open-hearth furnace."' 6 As Fortune observed, much
of this capacity "was obsolete when it was built," and the industry,
by installing it, "prepared itself for dying."'7 Or, as Forbes put it more
mildly, "In the Fifties, the steel industry poured hundreds of millions
of dollars into equipment that was already obsolete technologically-
open-hearth furnaces."8 The technological blunder may have cost
close to $1 billion in "white elephant" facilities.
The belated adoption of continuous casting by the steel giants is a
further illustration of their technological lethargy. Again, it was a
small company (Roanoke Electric), with an annual capacity of
100,000 tons, that pioneered in introducing this European invention
in the United States in 1962. Other small steel companies followed,
so that by 1968, firms with roughly 3 percent of the nation's steel
capacity accounted for 90 percent of continuous casting production
in the United States.9
Even defenders of the American steel giants concede that it was
the cold winds of competition rather than the sheltered atmosphere
of protectionism that ultimately forced the domestic majors to belat-
edly follow the path of technological progress. Thus, Alan McAdams
admits that by "1962 it appeared that the costs to United States
producers for not innovating were significantly raised by actual and
threatened competition from both domestic and foreign oxygen steel-
makers."' 0 Competition, not protection, broke down the industry's
habitual lethargy and resistance to change.
Even today, the United States steel industry seriously lags behind
Japan in the adoption and use of the latest steel technology. Thus,
according to the International Iron and Steel Institute, 81 percent of
Japan's crude steel in 1976 was produced in efficient basic oxygen
furnaces, compared with only 63 percent of United States output. By
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contrast, higher-cost open-hearth furnaces accounted for 18 percent
of United States crude steel production, but for only 0.5 percent in
Japan. Moreover, 35 percent of Japanese steel was produced by the
labor-saving continuous casting method, more than triple the 11 per-
cent in the United States." Also, as the Wall Street Journal reports,
the Japanese appear to benefit from economies of scale by using
giant blast furnaces to an extent unparalleled in the American steel
industry.12
Performance: Profits
It is a truism that steel industry profits are intimately linked, not only
with price increases that outpace cost increases, but with its ability
to maintain high rates of capacity utilization. The steel study by the
Council on Wage and Price Stability underscores this point. It finds
that profit rates from the end of World War II through 1957 were
good because of rapidly increasing prices and a high rate of capacity
utilization. Between 1958 and 1972, the Council says, profits were
poor because foreign competition prevented the industry from raising
prices substantially and because the industry's market strategy-its
refusal to cut prices to meet import competition-resulted in subopti-
mal levels of production. Only with the restriction of imports after
1969, the termination of government price controls in 1973, and an
abnormally strong worldwide demand for steel in 1974 was the in-
dustry able to operate at near full capacity and, hence, earn higher
profits. 13
Under the circumstances, one obvious (and, to the industry, pain-
less) way of increasing profits and cash flow is to restrain the most
potent competitive force in domestic steel markets, i.e., import com-
petition, and thus prevent price erosion and maintain capacity utili-
zation without a constant need to upgrade performance.
Import Restraints: Voluntary and Mandatory Quotas
The lesson was not lost on United States steel producers. Faced with
what they viewed as a mounting flood of imports, and after filing
unsuccessful countervailing duty and antidumping complaints, they
shifted their protectionist efforts to the legislative and public rela-
tions front. This strategy eventually paid off with the signing of the
Voluntary Restraint Agreement (hereinafter VRA) that went into ef-
fect on January 1, 1969.
Under the Agreement, annual steel imports from Japan and the
European Community were limited to 5.8 million tons each, com-
pared to their then current levels of 7.5 million and 7.3 million tons,
respectively. The Agreement also provided for an annual growth of 5
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percent in the allowable quotas. It was described approvingly by the
Chairman of the powerful Ways and Means Committee of the United
States House of Representatives as a "welcome and realistic step."
Within three years, the domestic industry found the VRA unsatis-
factory; quotas had not been established, either for specific products
or for individual exporting countries (other than Japan). Moreover,
both the Japanese and Europeans claimed that fabricated structural
steel and cold finished bars were not included in the VRA quotas,
since the quotas were expressed in tonnage terms. Therefore, they
rapidly expanded their shipments of stainless steel and other high-
value products to the United States market-despite their promise to
"try to maintain approximately the same product mix and pattern of
distribution" as before the accord was signed. The effect of this up-
grading in imports, combined with the inevitable increase in the
price of imported steel, was that the total value of steel imports was
as high in 1970 as in 1968 notwithstanding a 25 percent decline in
the volume of imports during the same period.
14
As a result, the three-year extension of the Agreement-announced
by the White House on May 6, 1972-contained specific tonnage limi-
tations on three categories of specialty steels (stainless, tool, and
other alloys) and set the quotas at less than their 1971 import level.
In addition, fabricated structural steel and cold-finished bars were
specifically included in the Agreement. Also, the participants agreed
to maintain their product mix and their customary geographic distri-
bution pattern. Finally, a 2.5 percent (instead of the former 5 per-
cent) annual increase in the allowable imports was to be applied to
the global tonnage allocated to Japan and the EEC.
To enforce the extended VRA, the United States installed a moni-
toring system to be administered by Treasury and the Customs Ser-
vice. The exporting countries not only had to agree among them-
selves to observe the VRA, but also had to set up machinery for the
producers within each country to arrive at mutually satisfactory ex-
port quotas to the United States market. In other words, Japanese
and European steel producers, under United States pressure, were
obliged to set up cartels in order to arrange for their share of the
United States market, and thus to engage in activity that is suspect,
if not illegal, under the Treaty of Paris. More importantly, however,
the connivance between the domestic industry, the State Depart-
ment, and foreign steel producers to limit imports triggered an anti-
trust suit by Consumers Union which charged that the VRA consti-
tuted a prima facie conspiracy under the Sherman Act. While the
Court eventually ruled only on the State Department's authority to
insulate the agreement from the antitrust laws, it left little doubt
that the foreign signatories to the pact could be held accountable for
participation in any trade restraints. In any event, the decision was
40 -Antidumping Law
clear enough to persuade all concerned that the VRA should not be
renewed when it expired in May, 1975.15
After the passage of the Trade Act of 1974, the industry's pressure
for action by the government-reinforced this time by the political
influence of organized labor-was crowned with success in the stain-
less and specialty steel sector. The International Trade Commission
ruled that the domestic firms were indeed injured by rising imports,
and recommended to the President the imposition of quotas on four
categories of specialty steel products.
16
Stating that quotas are an inflexible and relatively undesirable rem-
edy for the supposed injury, the President gave Japan, the EEC, and
Sweden ninety days to enter into voluntary "orderly marketing agree-
ments" with United States negotiators before approving the Commis-
sion's recommendation. Under the threat, the Japanese gave in,
signing a VRA on the final day of the ultimatum. The other coun-
tries, however, spurned the proposed arrangement. Quotas were im-
posed, as threatened, with the Japanese benefiting and the EEC los-
ing, as compared to the original Commission recommendations. 1
7
At every stage of the proceeding, the political power of the steel
industry was brought to bear on the decision makers. Senator
Schweiker of Pennsylvania, admitting that he was unfamiliar with
the relevant economic data, testified as an industry witness for the
Specialty Steel Committee. Mr. I. W. Abel, president of the United
Steel Workers, also testified as an industry witness. While the peti-
tion was still under consideration, Senator Ribicoff took the floor in
Congress 18 to excoriate the failure of the ITC, as evidenced in its
negative decisions theretofore, to carry out the Congressional intent
of the Trade Act of 1974. Moreover, after the ITC decision was an-
nounced, the president of Allegheny Ludlum Steel, the industry
spokesman, "truculently" threatened to go to Congress to override
the President if he did not approve the quotas recommended by the
ITC, 19 only to have his threat echoed by Senator Ribicoff as he pre-
sided over the Senate Finance Committee's oversight hearings on
United States foreign trade policy. The chain of events was an object
lesson in political economy.
What, then, were the economic consequences of the steel indus-
try's maneuverings on behalf of import quotas? First, the succession
of antidumping complaints, countervailing duty charges, mandatory
quota threats, the VRA, and the import injury case (followed by a
separate proceeding for the so-called round stainless steel wire indus-
try) must have had a chilling effect on the intensity of import compe-
tition. Import sales were probably reduced simply to avoid the ap-
pearance of an excessive inflow during the period when remedies
were being considered.
Second, there is hard evidence that the VRA has increased steel
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prices and raised costs to American industry and consumers. Thus,
according to one study, between January, 1960, and December,
1968, a period of nine years, the composite steel price index rose 4.1
points-or 0.45 points per year, indicating the moderating effects
which surging imports had on domestic prices. In the four years
between January, 1969, and December, 1972, while the VRA was in
effect, the steel price index rose 26.7 points-or 6.67 per year. Put
differently, steel prices increased at an annual rate fourteen times
greater after the import quotas went into effect than in the nine
years prior thereto.2 0 Other studies have estimated the annual cost
burden to the United States at between $386 million and $1 billion.
21
Third, the use of quotas, or the threat of quotas, to moderate the
intensity of competition from foreign steel has profound implications
for the battle against inflation. While it may be difficult to specify the
precise quantitative importance of steel in the wholesale price index,
there can be little doubt that price increases in steel are used to
justify concomitant price increases in a host of other products, par-
ticularly in the durable consumer goods industries.
Fourth, quotas are contagious, especially in times of weak de-
mand, and are reminiscent of the "beggar-thy-neighbor" policies of
the industrial nations during the Great Depression. Thus, while the
United States imposed specialty steel quotas on the major exporting
countries, the Europeans forced Japan to accept a "voluntary re-
straint" agreement on steel shipments into the EC. Japan "voluntar-
ily" agreed to reduce steel exports to EC nations during 1976 by 23.8
percent from 1975 levels.
2 2
Import Restraints: The Trigger Price System
The most recent import relief accorded the United States steel indus-
try was an outgrowth of the Solomon Report. A trigger price sys-
tem,23 administered by the Treasury Department, was a thinly veiled
scheme to put a floor under the price of imported steel,24 freeing the
domestic industry to resume its price escalation tactics. The conse-
quences were predictable.
First, the trigger price system, as its authors intended, resulted in
an increase in steel prices. Inevitably, it also fueled the cost-push
inflation which bedevils the United States economy.
Since the trigger prices were set at a level close to domestic list
prices, they precipitated a two-pronged upward pressure on the price
level: (a) importers could now raise prices that formerly reflected
world market conditions to the higher level dictated by trigger prices;
and (b) domestic producers could and did raise actual prices to at
least the list price, thus wiping out the discounts from list prices
which market conditions formerly compelled them to grant to their
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customers. Furthermore, domestic producers, protected by the mini-
mum prices established under the trigger price system, were now
free to raise list prices so that they would be higher than import
prices to at least the extent of the accustomed differential between
domestic and foreign prices.
The quantitative impact was substantial. On December 7, 1977,
one day after the concept of trigger pricing was announced by Presi-
dent Carter, a steel company executive stated that United States
steel prices would be increased in the first quarter of 1978. Shortly
thereafter, a 5.5 percent increase-reduced from an original 10.5 per-
cent increase-in the domestic price of basic steel products was
posted. This was followed by a further price rise of 1.1 percent in
April, 1978.
On May 10, 1978, Treasury announced that it was raising trigger
prices by 5.5 percent on sheet, plate, wire, and cold-finished bars;
13.9 percent on angles, 14 percent on reinforcing bars; and 14.5
percent on fiat bars.25 On August 2, Treasury raised the trigger prices
by another 4.86 percent, effective October 1, 1978;26 trigger price
increases for calendar year 1978 totalled 10.6 percent.
While domestic steelmakers had raised their list prices by some 9.5
percent as of October 1, 1978, steel buyers report that the prices they
actually had to pay increased by as much as 15 percent because, as
the Wall Street Journal notes, "last fall's widespread discounting has
evaporated.
27
Foreign producers are not displeased with these developments.
Thus, M. Jacques Ferry, head of the Common Market's steelmakers'
group, Eurofer, states: "We don't have any problems [with the trigger
price mechanism]. It has raised steel prices all around the world.
28
Similarly, Nippon Steel Corporation's president, Eishiro Saito, states
that United States trigger prices-coupled with the EEC's minimum
prices under the Davignon Plan-"have gone a long way in improv-
ing the world steel market, as these pricing measures helped steel-
makers everywhere to achieve better results (by) eliminating sales
below costs previously practiced for some steel products.
'29
The inflationary impact on the United States economy is, of course,
quite another matter. Considering only the original trigger prices
announced by Treasury in January, 1978, the Federal Trade Com-
mission, for instance, estimated the direct cost increase to steel con-
sumers at $1 billion.30 An official of the Brookings Institute esti-
mated that the direct price effect could be as much as $1.25 billion.31
Kurt Orban, a steel importer and international expert on steel mar-
kets, found that the trigger price system had resulted in a veritable
price explosion and estimated the increased steel costs to consumers
at $4 billion.32 Finally, if the domestic steel industry is to be believed
in its claim that imports have caused transaction prices to be $60 per
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ton below list prices, then estimates of increased steel costs could
range up to $6 billion. (Note that all these estimates are based on the
trigger prices of January, 1978, and do not, therefore, take account of
their 10.63 percent increase since then.)
Second, the long-run implications of trigger pricing are even more
foreboding. The publication and elaborate enforcement, under the
guise of monitoring, of minimum steel prices, is one of the most
efficient techniques for insuring concerted action among oligopolists
conscious of their interdependence. Thus, John Shenefield, Assistant
Attorney General in charge of the Antitrust Division, is currently
calling attention to the role of press conferences on price changes,
widely-publicized price announcements, and other techniques for
keeping one's fellow oligopolists informed of prevailing prices and
proposed changes, to insure parallel action.
33
The trigger pricing system carries this process one step further. It
provides wholly reliable, government-certified, minimum price lists,
subject to adjustment on a regular quarterly basis. Every domestic
producer of wire rod, for example, will at all times know the mini-
mum price at which this product can be imported and made avail-
able at every major port in the United States. Importers will be privy
to the same information. To allow-or, in this case, virtually to com-
pel-foreign steel producers to observe price floors on every major
steel product carries ad extremis the very conduct which Mr. Shene-
field finds in contravention of the antitrust laws. Through the inter-
cession of government, interdependent oligopolists are therefore in a
much better position to pursue a policy of price escalation than if
they had to depend on private means to achieve that objective, and
still remain within the strictures of the antitrust laws.
Third, most cartels break down because their members have a pro-
clivity and incentive for cheating. A maverick cuts prices, expands
his market share, and thus destroys the mutual trust on which the
cartel, of necessity, is based. The trigger pricing system, especially
when it is linked with a similar system enforced by the European
Economic Community, achieves cartel goals without assigning mar-
ket shares to its participants. By facilitating a framework of mini-
mum import prices, it forecloses price competition as a means of
winning new customers and hence insulates importer/customer rela-
tions from competition. Market shares will tend to change little, if at
all. Most importantly, the bargaining and negotiating that in the past
kept import prices flexible and forced the domestic firms to quote
varying discounts below their list prices will have been effectively
subverted. In brief, the trigger price mechanism, especially if it is to
be supplemented by import quotas, is a long step toward the reconsti-
tution of the old, interwar steel cartel.. Finally, we should note one further impact of the trigger price
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mechanism, viz, the impact on independent, nonintegrated wire
drawers and fabricators. In the wire segment of the industry, for
example, independent nonintegrated wire drawers are obliged to pur-
chase wire rod (their raw material) at trigger price minima while
facing competition in the sale of wire products at price levels prevail-
ing in a free, unsupported market. Further, to the extent that foreign
producers of wire products can purchase wire rod abroad at lower
prices, they can produce and sell wire products in their home market
and in the United States at a fair value that may be lower than
profitable sales prices or cost of production of domestic wire pro-
ducers. Thus, the independent, nonintegrated wire producers of the
United States are inevitably caught in a squeeze imposed by the
integrated mills at home and their rivals abroad.
34
Treasury does not dispute the existence of the squeeze on indepen-
dent nonintegrated wire drawers and fabricators resulting from its
imposition of the trigger price mechanism. Indeed, it insists that the
Antidumping Act-as administered under this mechanism-does
not prevent a foreign producer of merchandise such as barbed
wire from acquiring rod at low prices and fabricating that rod
into wire that is sold at correspondingly low prices in both its
home and export markets. In that situation, the producer is us-
ing savings in one factor of production no less proper than sav-
ings it may. achieve in labor costs or energy expenses. The Anti-
dumping Act is not aimed at preventing foreign producers from
relying on savings in their production costs; it only seeks to pre-
vent price discrimination in the sale of merchandise.3 5
Treasury further maintains that:
[t]o the extent that the independent producers of wire products
face competition from foreign and domestic rod suppliers who also
use some of their rod to make wire prodiicts-and, thus, compete
with their own customers-that problem is also beyond the reach
of the Antidumping Act. No provision of that law prevents a sup-
plier of a product, such as a rod, from setting high sales prices for
that product, even though it also sells articles it makes therefrom,
such as wire products, at relatively low prices to the disadvantage
of its rod customers. To the extent such competition comes from
domestic firms, the Antidumping Act cannot be applied at all; to
the extent it comes from foreign companies, only to the extent that
the wire product prices are below their own "fair value" can the
Act apply. But in that setting, the foreign wire maker's sales
prices for rods are not relevant.38
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Treasury admits that its administration of the trigger price mech-
anism will squeeze the nonintegrated fabricators-both by the do-
mestic integrated mills and foreign wire and wire products pro-
ducers. At the same time, Treasury disclaims responsibility for this
result. It takes the position that there is no relief for the noninte-
grated fabricators under the Antidumping Act, when in fact it is
Treasury's administration of that Act through the trigger price mech-
anism which has caused the very injury to which the fabricators are
subjected. Not only does Treasury's posture represent an abdication
of responsibility for promoting the public interest, but it ignores the
vital competitive role played by nonintegrated fabricators in what
would otherwise be a rigid, vertically integrated oligopoly marketY.
Import Restraints: Pending Proposals
Regulation breeds regulation; some protection leads to demands for
more protection, and eventually ends up with demands for total pro-
tection. Steel imports are no exception to this rule.
Thus, Lewis Foy, chairman of the Bethlehem Steel Corp. and presi-
dent of the American Iron and Steel Institute, is threatening to file a
major antidumping complaint against European steelmakers, unless
Treasury acts to curb imports (which in July, 1978, captured 19 per-
cent of the United States market as compared to 18 percent in the
same month a year earlier).38 The industry, according to the Wall
Street Journal, "just wants to keep the pressure on" in the hope of
obtaining favorable revisions of the trigger price system from Trea-
sury.39 What the steel lobby wants is a new set of trigger prices based
on European costs rather than on the lower Japanese costs.
Further, the United States industry, as might be expected from a
study of cartel history, and judging by rumors current in industry
circles, will almost inevitably have to demand an imposition of quan-
titative import restrictions to supplement the artificially high prices
mandated by the trigger price mechanism. The reason is obvious. As
the rising value of the yen pushes up the trigger prices based on
Japanese costs, more and more steel exporters find sales in the
American market increasingly remunerative which, in turn, induces
them to raise their export volume to the United States market. With-
out more, high prices induce an increase in supply which must be
restricted if the artificial price level is to be effectively maintained.
Import quotas, therefore, become an indispensable supplement to
trigger prices. And the higher the trigger prices, the greater the need
for such quotas.
Even quotas, however, are not the final step in this evolving sce-
nario. Import quotas may be "necessary to prevent severe continuing
damage to the American steel industry, '40 but they are no more than
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the first element of the industry's proposed, two-step "safeguard"
system. 41 The second element is a permanent, worldwide, manda-
tory, multilateral orderly marketing agreement for steel products.
42
Stripped of euphemism, this means, as the Wall Street Journal
noted, that the industry is really "angling for world-wide market rig-
ging and price fixing along the lines of the international textile
agreement. '43 It would mean comprehensive regulation of world
steel markets by a cartel organized with the succor, and operated
under the aegis of governmental authorities.
Summary
In light of the steel industry's performance since World War II, and the
import relief it has been periodically accorded, the fundamental ques-
tions about the link between import restraints and improved perfor-
mance remain. Are trigger prices, import quotas, or orderly marketing
agreements likely to provide the necessary spur for technological pro-
gressiveness? Will they assure the badly needed modernization of the
industry's anachronistic facilities? Will they provide the competitive
discipline to curb the industry's proclivity for constant price escala-
tion? Will they provide the government, in exchange for protection,
the ability to exact "good performance" as a quid pro quo for the
abandonment of competitive markets? In sum, as long as the industry
can reasonably count on periodic government bailouts to avoid the
consequences of its own conduct, does it have the incentive to perform
at levels which, given the compulsions of competition, it would have
to attain in order to survive? In light of the steel industry's record,
these questions hardly survive the asking.
SOME PUBLIC POLICY CONCLUSIONS
Steel, of course, is not the only industry where deficient performance
rather than imports is the basic explanation for "injury" or "probable
injury," and where import restraints are not the appropriate remedy
if improved economic performance is the goal.
In the automobile dumping case, 44 for example, the complaint filed
by the United Automobile Workers charged that the increased market
share of imported automobiles-up from 15.2 percent in 1970 to 15.9
percent in 1974 to 20.3 percent in the first half of 1975-was "at the
expense of domestic sales"; that, discounting the effects of the United
States recession, there was still a loss of domestic sales to imports;
and that the pricing of imported cars caused the resulting injury to
the American automobile industry and its workers. The union de-
manded the imposition of dumping penalties and simultaneously
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asked Congress for quota protection against the import of compacts
and subcompacts from Europe and Japan.
The complaint was dismissed "provisionally," after extended and
bizarre maneuvering by various instrumentalities of the administra-
tive bureaucracy.45 It was eventually settled when foreign producers,
at the insistence of United States government authorities, agreed to
raise their prices in the United States market.
To a disinterested observer it is apparent that such injury as the
industry suffered was not caused by imports, but rather deficient
performance. First, a primary factor explaining the industry's tra-
vails-one that requires no elaboration-was the national recession
which drastically reduced the demand for virtually all consumer dura-
bles, including automobiles.
Second, the success of the imports was partly attributable to the
delayed response by United States car manufacturers to a shift in
consumer demand toward smaller, more fuel-efficient models. As of
January, 1975, according to the Council on Wage and Price Stability,
no domestic cars obtained twenty miles per gallon or more in the
EPA city driving test, whereas fifteen of nineteen foreign compacts
and subcompacts obtained twenty miles per gallon or better. In the
highway driving test, no United States compact or subcompact car
had a mileage rating of over thirty miles per gallon whereas fourteen
of nineteen foreign makes did.
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Third, while foreign producers liquidated their large inventories of
1974 models at 1974 prices well into 1975, United States manufac-
turers posted price increases of roughly 12 percent on their 1975
models which went on sale in the autumn of 1974. This perverse
pricing policy by United States producers in the face of a deepening
recession, combined with the realistic market-oriented price policy of
their foreign competitors, was an additional factor explaining the
dramatic market penetration of the imports.
Fourth, the fact that imported compacts and subcompacts offered
consumers a far wider range of price alternatives compared to their
United States counterparts, may also have given imports a competi-
tive edge over domestic models.
In any event, as the Council on Wage and Price Stability told the
International Trade Commission (hereinafter the ITC), the most im-
portant factors explaining the increased market share of foreign auto-
mobiles "are the pricing policies of domestic producers and the inabil-
ity of domestic manufacturers to respond rapidly to changing market
conditions. 47 The Council warned the ITC that the imposition of spe-
cial dumping penalties
would likely result in an immediate increase in the price of au-
tomobiles to the American consumer. Moreover, such penalties,
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or even the threat of penalties, could substantially check what
has been perhaps the single most effective spur to competition
in this highly concentrated industry. This, in turn, could lead to
less competitive prices and a reduced level of innovation.
48
One can only speculate on what might have been, if either dump-
ing penalties or import quotas had been ordered. Would this have
intensified the sensitivity of the domestic industry to the vagaries of
consumer tastes? Would it have given the lusty automobile oligopoly
(which cast itself in the role of an infant industry) the needed respite
to adjust to foreign competition without long-term protection? Would
it have accelerated the introduction of revolutionary engines or the
development of radically new body designs? Would it have spurred
investments in United States plants by foreign manufacturers, or
discouraged the expansion by United States multinationals in their
foreign affiliates? What would have been the effect on X-efficiency
and on the industry's traditional pricing policy? Neither a savant-
sans-culottes nor an expert armed with computer models and mul-
tiple regressions would dare offer a definitive response.
Clearly, the problem of assessing quota-performance links is com-
plex, if not insoluble. As United States experience with the so-called
independent regulatory commissions demonstrates, an administra-
tive agency, in the absence of competitive yardsticks, does not know
what constitutes "good" performance; nor does it know how perfor-
mance could be improved by changing an industry's structure. Most
important, even if it did, the agency would lack the regulatory arse-
nal to exact "good" performance as a quid pro quo for protection
from competition.
It is a truism that once competition has been abandoned, or signifi-
cantly crippled-and this is a necessary consequence of import quo-
tas-some surrogate for the competitive process must be devised to
assure acceptable performance and to induce progressive perfor-
mance. Otherwise, the restrictions imposed would not only be injuri-
ous to consumers and detract from the general welfare, but would
also fail to accomplish their only justifiable goal, i.e., to give tempo-
rary protection to an infant industry.
It would seem, and here again the United States experience with
regulation is enlightening, that there are only two systems of indus-
trial organization, each with inherent shortcomings, which might be
effective substitutes for competitive controls. One alternative is per-
vasive, dictatorial regulation, with an elaborate mechanism of
rewards and penalties, reaching down to the management level, util-
izing the most advanced techniques of management science, and cap-
able of simulating the crucial elements of competitive structure and
behavior. The cost of such regulation, not only directly, but in terms of
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stifling entrepreneurial initiative, may suffice to condemn it. Another
alternative is government ownership, again with the appropriate
complement of efficiency-compelling and progress-inducing direc-
tives. In some circumstances, this solution appears to economize re-
sources as compared to "effective" regulation. However, when the
industry in question is not a natural monopoly, both regulation and
nationalization (as Oscar Lange recognized long ago) almost inevita-
bly tend to introduce bureaucratic rigidities and inefficiencies whose
intensity will increase with the extent and detail of control.
One is driven to the conclusion, therefore, that import restrictions
are to be embraced, if at all, only within a framework of comprehen-
sive control, so that "good" performance is not jeopardized by the
attenuation of competition and its disciplinary incentives.
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